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  Disagreement Recognized by Hiatt v. Union Pacific R. Co., D.Wyo., 
August 3, 1994 
922 F.2d 766 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Eleventh Circuit. 
Roderick MacPHERSON and Marvin Narz, 
Plaintiffs–Appellants, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF MONTEVALLO, 
Defendant–Appellee. 
No. 89–7752. 
| 
Jan. 30, 1991. 
Professors brought action against university, alleging that 
university discriminated against them with respect to their 
compensation because of their age, in violation of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, 
No. CV88–H–1341–S, James Hughes Hancock, J., 
directed verdict for university on professors’ disparate 
impact claim, and after jury returned verdict for 
professors on disparate treatment claim and awarded 
damages, entered judgment notwithstanding verdict and, 
in alternative, granted motion for new trial. Professors 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Edmondson, Circuit 
Judge, held that: (1) university’s desire to attract and hire 
good new faculty members was legitimate business 
reason for its alleged practice of paying market rates to 
newly hired faculty members; (2) professors failed to 
produce adequate alternative employment practice; (3) 
whether reasons offered by university for salary 
differential was pretext for age discrimination presented 
question for jury on disparate treatment theory; but (4) 
new trial was not an abuse of discretion. 
  
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for new 
trial. 
  
 
 
West Headnotes (13) 
 
 
[1] 
 
Civil Rights 
Disparate impact 
 
 Under disparate impact theory, discrimination 
can be established by proving that facially 
neutral employment practice, which is 
unjustified by legitimate business goal of 
employer, has disproportionately adverse impact 
on members of protected group. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
7 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[2] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
 
 To make prima facie case of age discrimination 
under disparate impact theory, plaintiff must 
isolate and identify specific employment 
practices that are allegedly responsible for any 
observed statistical disparities; for plaintiff to 
show that there is an imbalance is not enough. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
12 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[3] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
 
 Once plaintiff has established prima facie case 
of age discrimination under disparate impact 
theory, burden shifts to employer to produce 
evidence to justify its use of challenged practice 
by showing that it serves, in significant way, 
employer’s legitimate employment goals; while 
employer bears burden of production on 
business justification, burden of 
persuasion—and ultimate burden of proving that 
alleged discrimination has been caused by 
specific employment practice—remains on 
plaintiff at all times. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
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U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[4] 
 
Civil Rights 
Disparate impact 
 
 If employer successfully establishes that 
challenged business practice significantly serves 
employer’s legitimate employment goals, 
plaintiff may still be able to prevail on claim of 
age discrimination under disparate impact 
theory if he can persuade fact finder that 
alternative practice exists which would be 
equally effective in meeting employer’s 
legitimate goals without producing adverse 
effect on protected group. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
9 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[5] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
 Despite practice of having shifting burdens of 
production in employment discrimination cases, 
grants of directed verdicts for defendants at 
close of plaintiff’s evidence are proper even if 
plaintiff has made out prima facie case as long 
as plaintiff’s case-in-chief also contains 
evidence sufficient to meet defendant’s burden 
of production and evidence overall at close of 
plaintiff’s case is insufficient to allow rational 
jury to find for plaintiff. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
15 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[6] 
 
Civil Rights 
Disparate impact 
 
 University’s need to pay market rates to attract 
and to hire good new faculty members was 
legitimate business reason for university’s 
claimed practice of paying market rates to newly 
hired faculty members but not to others, which 
practice was alleged to have disparate impact on 
older professors. Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[7] 
 
Civil Rights 
Disparate impact 
 
 Plaintiff in disparate impact suit bears some 
burden of proving that plaintiff’s suggested 
alternative practice is no more expensive than 
employer’s current practice, or—at the very 
least—that practice is economically feasible for 
employer. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et 
seq. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[8] 
 
Civil Rights 
Disparate impact 
 
 Professors claiming that university’s charged 
practice of paying market rates to only newly 
hired faculty was age discriminatory under 
disparate impact theory failed to present 
adequate alternative practice that would meet 
university’s legitimate goals of attracting and 
hiring good new faculty members without 
producing adverse effect on protected group, 
where sole evidence produced at trial of 
alternative employment practice was testimony 
that obvious alternative was to pay market rates 
to everybody, without any indication as to 
whether to do so would be economically 
possible. Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et 
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seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[9] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
 
 Prima facie case that plaintiffs would have to 
prove in case of age discrimination in 
compensation would be that they were members 
of protected age group, that they received low 
wages, that similarly situated persons outside 
protected age group received higher wages, and 
that they were qualified to receive higher wages. 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
42 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[10] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
 
 Professors established prima facie case of age 
discrimination in their compensation from 
university, where both professors were in their 
early fifties, and presented evidence that they 
were poorly compensated compared to most 
other members of business school faculty, that 
younger faculty members received greater 
compensation, and that their evaluations were in 
same range as other faculty members. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
3 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[11] 
 
Civil Rights 
Age discrimination 
 
 University articulated legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reasons for disparity in 
compensation, rebutting presumption of 
discriminatory motive arising from professors’ 
prima facie case of age discrimination, by 
introducing evidence indicating that starting 
salaries, based on nondiscriminatory market 
rates, led to any observed disparities, that 
starting salaries reflected current market rate for 
particular field of discipline, that evaluation 
scores had little effect on salaries, that plaintiff 
professors were in lower paying fields, and that 
plaintiff professors failed to do significant 
research and publication. Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
8 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[12] 
 
Civil Rights 
Questions of law or fact 
 
 Whether legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons 
put forth by university for compensation 
disparity were pretext for age discrimination 
presented question for jury, in view of evidence 
presented casting doubt on university’s claims 
that faculty evaluations had little to do with 
annual raises, that market-based starting salaries 
were cause of salary differentials, and that 
differentials were caused by disparities in 
training and published works. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
[13] 
 
Federal Civil Procedure 
Weight of evidence 
 
 District court acted within its discretion in 
granting new trial in professors’ age 
discrimination action against university based 
upon its belief that verdict for professors was 
against weight of evidence, its concerns about 
relevance of evidence submitted under disparate 
impact theory to disparate treatment theory, 
likelihood of jury confusion, and its perception 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
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that expert testimony presented by professors 
dealt largely with fairness of university’s 
treatment of professors, as opposed to whether 
university committed age discrimination. Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, § 
2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 et seq. 
11 Cases that cite this headnote 
 
 
 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*768 Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Franklin G. Shuler, Jr., 
Jeremiah A. Collins, Cooper, Mitch, Crawford, 
Kuykendall & Whatley, Birmingham, Ala., John M. 
West, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Washington, D.C., for 
plaintiffs-appellants. 
Carl E. Johnson, Jr., Birmingham, Ala., for 
defendant-appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Alabama. 
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and 
RE*, Chief Judge. 
Opinion 
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellants Roderick S. MacPherson and Marvin J. Narz, 
plaintiffs below, appeal the district court’s disposition of 
their age discrimination suit against the University of 
Montevallo (the “University”) brought under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The complaint alleged that the 
University had discriminated against them with respect to 
their compensation because of their age, and sought 
damages, injunctive *769 relief, and litigation costs and 
expenses, including attorney’s fees.1 The case was tried 
before a jury; and at the close of plaintiffs’ case, the 
district court directed a verdict for defendant on one of 
plaintiffs’ theories, disparate impact. The jury returned a 
verdict for plaintiffs on the disparate treatment theory and 
awarded damages, but the district court entered judgment 
not withstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) for defendants and, 
in the alternative, granted defendant’s motion for new 
trial. MacPherson and Narz appeal the directed verdict 
against them on the disparate impact theory and the grant 
of defendant’s motion for j.n.o.v./new trial. We affirm the 
directed verdict for the University on the disparate impact 
theory. On the disparate treatment theory, we vacate 
j.n.o.v. for the University but affirm the district court’s 
grant of new trial. 
  
 
I. BACKGROUND 
The University is a small state institution of higher 
education. The plaintiffs MacPherson and Narz are 
full-time associate professors of its College of Business.2 
MacPherson—who was born in 1937 and has a doctorate 
in marketing—started teaching at the University in 1973 
as an assistant professor, was tenured in 1978, and was 
promoted to associate professor in 1981. Narz—who was 
born in 1936, has an undergraduate degree in accounting, 
is a Certified Public Accountant, and has a J.D. 
degree—started teaching at the University in 1978 as an 
associate professor; he is a professor of business law but 
has also taught accounting and taxation.3 With the 
exception of one professor hired after the start of this 
litigation, plaintiffs are the oldest faculty members of the 
College of Business. They are also the longest-serving 
members of the faculty.4 Nevertheless, MacPherson and 
Narz are the lowest paid members of the College of 
Business faculty, with the exception of an assistant 
professor who holds only an MBA (which is not 
considered a terminal degree) and an assistant professor 
who was hired in 1988 and does not have a Ph.D. 
  
In 1979, Dr. William Word was hired as the Dean of the 
College of Business with a mandate from the University 
to obtain accreditation for the College of Business by the 
American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business 
(“A.A.C.S.B.”).5 His evaluation of the College of 
Business led to the conclusion that, to obtain 
accreditation, the University would need—among other 
things—to hire doctorally qualified6 professors in 
accounting, finance, and management.7 Since his 
appointment as dean, Word has hired 25 new faculty 
members, 17 under the age of 40 and 8 over the age *770 
of 40, for the purpose of achieving accreditation. 
According to defendant, this was necessary to obtain a 
sufficient number of doctorally qualified professors in 
the various business school fields and to obtain 
professors who are researchers and publishers of articles.8 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
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A faculty member’s compensation at the University is 
determined by the level of his beginning salary and raises 
realized through promotion, across-the-board increases, 
merit raises, and market adjustment increases. When 
additional funds become available for business school 
salaries (apart from promotion and market adjustment 
salary allotments), 70 per cent of the new money is 
distributed in across-the-board raises and 30 per cent is 
distributed in merit raises according to a formula based on 
the faculty member’s annual evaluation score as 
compared to the average evaluation score in the College 
of Business. According to Dean Word, salary differentials 
based on merit raises are insignificant because the range 
of evaluation scores is not great. A faculty member’s 
starting salary is based on a number of market-related 
variables which affect an applicant’s desirability and, 
hence, the salary that universities are willing to offer the 
applicant. The main factor affecting a faculty member’s 
initial salary is his field or discipline. After field or 
discipline, an applicant’s research and publication records 
(and potential for additional publication) are the most 
important variables in determining his initial salary, in 
Dean Word’s opinion. 
  
 
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standard of review we employ in reviewing the 
district court’s disposition of a motion for directed verdict 
or for j.n.o.v. is the same as that used by the district court 
to determine whether to grant either motion. District and 
appellate courts should consider all of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and with all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmover. 
Verbraeken v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 
1044–45 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 
411 F.2d 365, 374–75 (5th Cir.1969)). If the facts and 
inferences are so strong that the court believes that 
reasonable persons in the exercise of impartial judgment 
could not arrive at a contrary verdict, the district court 
properly grants a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. Id. at 1045. If, 
however, the evidence is such that “reasonable and 
fairminded men in the exercise of impartial judgment 
might reach different conclusions,” it is improper for the 
district court to grant a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. Id. 
  
Motions for new trial are within the sound discretion of 
the district court. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 
L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Thus, an appellate court employs the 
abuse of discretion standard to review the district court’s 
ruling on a motion for a new trial. Verbraeken, 881 F.2d 
at 1049. As we stated in Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure 
Products, Inc., this standard “recognizes the deference 
that is due the trial court’s first-hand experience of the 
witnesses, their demeanor, and a context of the trial.” 827 
F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.1987). But we have also 
recognized that “we should more strictly scrutinize orders 
which grant new trials, where the basis for the order is 
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (as 
opposed to situations where there is new evidence, for 
example).” Id. (emphasis in original). The concern is that 
“the [trial] judge does not simply substitute his judgment 
for that of the jury, thus depriving the litigants of their 
right to trial by jury.” Id. 
  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Disparate Impact Theory 
Appellants’ disparate impact theory of discrimination is 
that the University’s alleged practice of paying market 
rates of salary to new faculty hires, but not paying the 
market rate to incumbent professors, has a disparate 
impact on older people because *771 they tend to be the 
faculty members who have been at the University the 
longest. They contend that, because the University had 
not carried its burden of producing evidence of a business 
justification for this alleged practice, the district court 
erred in granting a directed verdict at the conclusion of 
plaintiffs’ evidence. 
  
[1] Under disparate impact theory, discrimination can be 
established by proving that a facially neutral employment 
practice, which is unjustified by a legitimate business goal 
of the employer, has a disproportionately adverse impact 
on the members of a protected group. Wards Cove 
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655–56, 109 
S.Ct. 2115, 2124, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989). It was 
developed “as a form of pretext analysis to handle 
specific employment practices not obviously job-related.” 
Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 707 
(9th Cir.1984). 
  
[2] To make a prima facie case under the disparate impact 
theory, a plaintiff must isolate and identify “the specific 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
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employment practices that are allegedly responsible for 
any observed statistical disparities.” Wards Cove, 490 
U.S. at 656, 109 S.Ct. at 2124 (quoting Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 994, 108 S.Ct. 
2777, 2788, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988)). The Supreme Court 
has said that causation is an important part of the 
disparate impact prima facie case: “a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or 
particular employment practice that has created the 
disparate impact under attack.” Id. at 657, 109 S.Ct. at 
2124. For a plaintiff to show that there is an imbalance is 
not enough. Id. at 657, 109 S.Ct. at 2124. 
  
[3] Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to 
produce evidence to justify its use of the challenged 
practice.9 When considering the employer’s justification, 
“the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice 
serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment 
goals of the employer.” Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659, 109 
S.Ct. at 2125–26. An insubstantial justification will not 
suffice in this analysis, but “there is no requirement that 
the challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to 
the employer’s business for it to pass muster.” Id. at 659, 
109 S.Ct. at 2126. While the employer bears the burden of 
production on its business justification, the burden of 
persuasion—and the ultimate burden of proving that the 
alleged discrimination has been caused by a specific 
employment practice—remains on the plaintiff at all 
times. Id. at 659, 109 S.Ct. at 2126. 
  
[4] If an employer successfully establishes that the 
challenged business practice significantly serves the 
employer’s legitimate employment goals, a plaintiff may 
still be able to prevail if he can persuade the factfinder 
that an alternative practice exists which would meet the 
employer’s legitimate goals without producing an adverse 
effect on the protected group. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 
659, 109 S.Ct. at 2126. If the employer refuses to adopt 
the alternatives, the refusal “would belie [the employer’s 
claim] that their incumbent practices are being employed 
for nondiscriminatory reasons.” Id. at 660–61, 109 S.Ct. 
at 2126–27. But, the Supreme Court has indicated that 
just suggesting an alternative practice is insufficient to 
meet the plaintiff’s burden: the alternative practice “must 
be equally effective as [the employer’s chosen practice] in 
achieving [its] legitimate employment goals.” Id. at 661, 
109 S.Ct. at 2127. The burdens imposed on the 
employer—including cost—by the alternative practices 
are “relevant in determining whether they would be 
equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving 
the employer’s legitimate business goals.” Id. at 661, 109 
S.Ct. at 2127 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 998, 108 S.Ct. 
at 2790). 
  
*772 [5] [6] We conclude that the district court properly 
granted the University’s motion for directed verdict on the 
disparate impact theory at the close of plaintiffs’ case.10 
First, we doubt that reasonable jurors could find that the 
University had a practice or policy of paying market rates 
to newly-hired faculty members but not to others.11 
Plaintiffs did establish that the University has a practice 
of paying market rates to newly-hired professors; they 
may not, however, have shown that the University has a 
practice of not providing market-based adjustments to the 
salaries of established professors. As MacPherson 
admitted, the University provides special salary 
adjustments—beyond across-the-board and merit 
raises—which are given for market reasons. He also 
admitted to having received such a market adjustment in 
1981 or 1982; Narz also received a market adjustment at 
that time. Dean Word, called as a witness by plaintiffs, 
testified regarding market adjustments to salaries, which 
he said were based on the faculty member’s specialty or 
discipline. To illustrate, he used the market adjustments 
granted in the 1988–1989 school year: in that school year, 
he gave market adjustments to three Ph.D.s in the 
accounting field and to two management professors who 
had computer training; he stated that adjustments for 
market conditions are “primarily based upon discipline. 
Whether one is in accounting, finance, et cetera. And how 
difficult it is to get these people and how much 
adjustment money [he] think[s he] can free up.” In other 
words, the University’s market adjustments are made to 
enable it to retain good professors in fields in which 
professors are in great demand. 
  
We do not, however, base our decision in this case on our 
doubt as to whether plaintiffs sufficiently proved the 
practice they alleged. Assuming, for the sake of 
discussion, that plaintiffs established that the University 
has a practice of paying market rates to newly-hired 
faculty members but not to others, and that this practice 
has a disparate impact on older professors, we still agree 
with the district court’s direction of the verdict on the 
disparate impact theory. MacPherson and Narz presented 
evidence tending to suggest that a practice of paying 
market-rate salaries only to new hires had disparate 
impact on older professors who were likely to have been 
at the University longer. But, the University’s contention 
that there was a legitimate business reason for this 
practice—that the University had to pay market rates to 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 
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attract and to hire good new faculty members—was 
undisputed by plaintiffs and admitted by plaintiffs’ expert, 
Dr. Ignatin, on cross-examination. The University thus 
established, through uncontroverted evidence, that there 
was a legitimate business reason for this employment 
practice; no reasonable juror could find otherwise. 
  
[7] [8] The sole evidence that MacPherson and Narz 
produced at trial for an alternative employment practice 
which would avoid the alleged disparate impact on older 
professors was Dr. Ignatin’s testimony that “[t]he 
obvious alternative is you can pay market rates to 
everybody.” R. 3–376. The district court concluded, as we 
read what the judge said when he orally granted the 
University’s motion for directed verdict, that this sole 
statement was insufficient *773 to meet plaintiffs’ burden 
to prove an alternative.12 We agree. 
  
In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court showed that to meet 
plaintiffs’ burden under a disparate impact theory, 
plaintiffs have to do more than suggest an alternative 
practice. The Court said that “any alternative practice ... 
must be equally effective as [the employer’s chosen 
practice] in achieving [its] legitimate employment goals.” 
490 U.S. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127. It indicated that one of 
the factors to be considered in determining whether the 
alternative is equally effective is the cost the alternative 
imposes on the employer. Id. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127. 
Because “ ‘[c]ourts are generally less competent than 
employers to restructure business practices,’ ... the 
judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that 
an employer must adopt a plaintiff’s alternative 
[employment practice].” Id. at 661, 109 S.Ct. at 2127 
(quoting Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 
567, 578, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978)). 
From this, we infer that the plaintiff in a disparate impact 
suit bears some burden of proving that plaintiff’s 
suggested alternative practice is no more expensive than 
the employer’s current practice, or—at the very 
least—that the practice is economically feasible for the 
employer. 
  
Plaintiffs in this case never presented evidence to show 
that requiring the University to pay the A.A.C.S.B. 
“market rate” to longer-serving professors is 
economically possible for the University.13 The evidence 
which was presented during plaintiffs’ case suggests that 
such an alternative is infeasible. Both Dean Word and 
plaintiff MacPherson indicated that salaries had been 
frozen twice for periods of one year. In addition, Dean 
Word testified that the University is “in a limited budget 
situation”; that the University is in a poorer financial 
situation than public universities in other states; that “a lot 
of years we don’t get raises at all”; and that, financially, 
“it is pretty tight.” Therefore, we conclude that plaintiffs 
failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the existence 
of an equally effective, financially feasible, alternative 
practice that a rational jury could accept. 
  
Assuming that plaintiffs adequately proved the alleged 
two-part practice (paying new hires at market rates and 
not paying others at market rates) of the University, we 
affirm the district court’s decision to direct the verdict on 
the disparate impact claim for defendant University based 
on plaintiffs’ failure to present an equally effective, 
alternative practice in the light of the University’s proof 
of a legitimate business justification for its practice of 
paying new hires at market rates of compensation.14 
  
 
B. The Disparate Treatment Theory 
1. The Grant of J.N.O.V. 
MacPherson and Narz contend that the district court erred 
in granting j.n.o.v. to *774 the University on plaintiffs’ 
claim of age discrimination based on the disparate 
treatment theory because the record is such that a 
reasonable jury could have concluded that the University 
intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of 
their age. 
  
Unlike the disparate impact model of discrimination, 
“disparate treatment cases necessarily require direct or 
circumstantial proof of discriminatory motive, whereas no 
such proof is required in disparate impact cases.” 
Spaulding, 740 F.2d at 700; see also AFSCME v. State of 
Washington, 770 F.2d at 1405. A plaintiff employing 
circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination can 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination—by a 
preponderance of the evidence—using the four-part test 
of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 
S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Carter v. City of 
Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir.1989). If the plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant employer “to articulate 
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the 
employer’s action. Then, if the defendant employer meets 
that burden, the plaintiff must show by the preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant’s legitimate reasons 
were not the reasons that actually motivated its conduct, 
that the reasons were merely a “pretext for 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 
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discrimination.” See Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 
1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). We have stated before that, 
at this last stage, the plaintiff must establish “by 
significantly probative evidence that the proffered reason 
is a pretext for discrimination.” Carter, 870 F.2d at 584. 
  
[9] This Circuit has adopted a modified version of the 
McDonnell Douglas test to allow ADEA plaintiffs to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with 
circumstantial evidence. The prima facie case that 
plaintiffs would have to prove in this case of age 
discrimination in compensation would be that (1) they 
are members of the protected group of persons between 
the ages of 40 and 70; (2) they received low wages; (3) 
similarly situated persons outside the protected age group 
received higher wages;15 and (4) they were qualified to 
receive the higher wages. See Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at 
1045. 
  
[10] Here, plaintiffs established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. In 1988, MacPherson and Narz were 
both in their early fifties. Plaintiffs presented evidence 
that, compared to most members of the College of 
Business faculty, they were poorly compensated. Their 
expert, Dr. George Ignatin, did a comparator analysis of 
their 1988 salaries.16 He compared MacPherson, an 
associate professor in marketing with Professors Mikan 
and Hamilton, assistant professors of management,17 both 
of whom were younger than he was and had less 
experience teaching; Ignatin found that MacPherson was 
paid less than Mikan and Hamilton. Ignatin compared 
Narz, an associate professor of business law/accounting, 
with Professors Rovelstad and Ryerson, younger 
assistant professors of accounting.18 Narz was paid 
significantly less than they were. Plaintiffs also produced 
evidence regarding their evaluations, which were in the 
same range as the professors to whom they were 
compared: MacPherson’s average evaluation over an 
eight-year period was 3.82 compared to Mikan’s 3.75 and 
Hamilton’s 3.91; Narz’s *775 evaluation average was 
3.79, as compared to Rovelstad’s 3.90 and Ryerson’s 
3.97. 
  
[11] To rebut the presumption of discriminatory motive 
that arises when an ADEA plaintiff makes out a prima 
facie case, the employer has “to articulate a legitimate 
non-discriminatory reason” for its actions. See Carter, 
870 F.2d at 584; Young, 840 F.2d at 830. The employer 
must present “evidence which ‘raises a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.’ ” 
Stanfield v. Answering Service, Inc., 867 F.2d 1290, 1294 
(11th Cir.1989) (quoting Archambault v. United 
Computing Sys., Inc., 786 F.2d 1507, 1512 (11th 
Cir.1986) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 
1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207)). 
  
The University presented legitimate non-discriminatory 
reasons for the disparities in salaries and presented 
evidence which called into question the evidence offered 
by plaintiffs. The University introduced evidence 
indicating that starting salaries, based on 
non-discriminatory market rates, led to any observed 
disparities; thus, increases in compensation were not 
responsible for these disparities. The University also 
stressed that starting salaries reflect the current market 
rate for the particular field or discipline, with accounting 
paying the most and business law paying the least.19 In 
addition, the University presented evidence through the 
testimony of Dean Word that the evaluation scores—on 
which plaintiffs put emphasis—have little effect on 
salaries, apart from merit increases which represent only a 
small portion of post-hire salary increases. The University 
also cast doubt on the comparator analysis presented by 
plaintiffs. Dr. Ignatin admitted that the set of professors 
“show a lot of non-comparability”; that there are “some 
remarkable noncomparabilities” in terms of 
field/discipline, degree, and salary range; and that 
plaintiffs are “obviously not equivalent” to the people 
with whom they were compared. 
  
The comparator analysis of MacPherson crossed two 
steps (rank and field) and neglected to examine the salary 
of another associate professor of marketing who was just 
four years younger than MacPherson and is well 
compensated. In addition, the University produced 
evidence that Mikan and Hamilton had management 
information system (M.I.S.) skills and that their salaries 
were established in the light of that training and their 
M.I.S. credentials because of the University’s need for 
such skills in the A.A.C.S.B. accreditation process. On the 
comparator analysis of Narz, the University showed that 
Narz’s field of business law is the lowest paying field in 
the College of Business while the compared field of 
accounting is the highest. The University suggested that 
Narz could not be considered half in the accounting 
field—despite the fact that he taught some accounting 
courses—because A.A.C.S.B. requirements dictate that in 
order to be considered qualified to teach any course in a 
given field, the professor has to be doctorally qualified, 
that is, the professor must hold a terminal degree in that 
field, which Narz does not. Moreover, the University 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 
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presented testimony indicating that both MacPherson and 
Narz have failed to do significant research and 
publication, thus explaining part of the salary 
differentials. The University also presented the testimony 
of Dr. Baker, its expert economist, who stated that in 
doing a comparator analysis, an individual must be 
matched with persons having similar job-related 
characteristics who were similarly situated. She 
concluded that there were not enough similarly situated 
faculty members at the College of Business to do a 
comparator analysis. 
  
[12] Because the University pointed out legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons for the salary differentials, 
plaintiffs were required to show, by “significantly 
probative evidence,” that the proffered reasons were 
merely a pretext for discrimination. Carter, 870 F.2d at 
584. Plaintiffs could do so “either directly by persuading 
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely 
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the 
employer’s proffered explanation *776 is unworthy of 
credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; 
Carter, 870 F.2d at 584. 
  
Certain evidence presented at trial by plaintiffs can be 
fairly said to cast a doubt on the University’s proffered 
reasons for salary differentials and could be viewed by a 
reasonable jury as showing that the University’s proffered 
explanations are unworthy of belief. Plaintiffs drew 
testimony from Dean Word that the annual raises are 
based on the evaluations of the professors, casting doubt 
on the University’s assertions that evaluations have little 
to do with annual raises. About the University’s 
explanation that market-based starting salaries are the 
cause of salary differentials, plaintiffs presented evidence 
that Mikan and Hamilton, to whom MacPherson was 
compared, were hired at salaries below MacPherson’s 
contemporaneous salary, but have gradually surpassed 
him in compensation. While Ryerson, to whom Narz was 
compared, started at a salary approximately the same as 
Narz’s contemporaneous salary, Ryerson now earns 
significantly more; the rate of salary increase for 
Rovelstad, who was hired at a higher salary than Narz’s 
contemporaneous salary, was greater than the rate at 
which Narz’s salary increased. Evidence also showed that 
MacPherson was making less than younger, less senior 
professors in an academic field in which salary levels 
were virtually identical to his field and that this 
differential occurred after Mikan and Hamilton were 
hired, making it unlikely that the differential occurred 
because of their M.I.S. training (a factor that would 
explain an initial salary differential, but not subsequent 
discrepancies).20 In addition, plaintiffs presented evidence 
that the professors to whom MacPherson and Narz were 
compared had produced little in the way of publications; 
thus, salary differentials could not be explained by raises 
based on the publishing of articles. On the University’s 
characterization of Narz as a business law professor, 
evidence showed that he was hired as an accounting 
professor and only later began to teach business law 
courses. 
  
We conclude that there is “evidence of such quality and 
weight that reasonable and fairminded men in the exercise 
of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” 
See Verbraeken, 881 F.2d at 1045. The evidence 
presented by plaintiffs is sufficient to allow a jury in the 
exercise of impartial judgment to conclude that the 
University’s proffered explanations are unworthy of 
belief. Therefore, we hold that the district court erred in 
granting j.n.o.v. to the defendant University, and we 
vacate that judgment. 
  
 
2. The Alternative Grant of a New Trial. 
[13] Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its 
discretion in its alternative grant of new trial. They say 
that the district court’s belief that the jury was confused 
by the disparate impact evidence was based on an 
erroneous view of the law and the record and results in 
the court’s simply substituting its judgment for that of the 
jury. They also contend that the district court’s view that 
the jury was confused about the law or misled by 
sympathy rests on speculation. 
  
The district court based its conditional grant of new trial 
on several reasons. It thought that “the verdict was a 
result of confusion on the part of the jury (perhaps 
engendered by the major thrust of the plaintiffs’ 
evidentiary presentation which was devoted to the 
disparate impact claims), if not expressly the result of 
sympathy or bias.” Memorandum of Decision at 2 n. 1 
(emphasis in original). The district court also believed 
that a new trial should be granted so that “evidentiary 
rulings could be made without there being in the case 
claims predicated upon disparate impact.” Id. at 4. In 
addition, the trial judge was concerned about the 
testimony of plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Ignatin, whose 
“presentation of evidence on issues of liability was largely 
devoted to (a) disparate *777 impact analysis and (b) 
what he felt was fair and unfair.” Id. 
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We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for new 
trial under the abuse of discretion standard because 
“deference [ ] is due the trial court’s first-hand experience 
of the witnesses, their demeanor, and a context of the 
trial.” Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1498. Plaintiffs contend that 
we should look more strictly at this grant of a new trial, 
implying that the basis for the order is the judge’s view 
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. But 
we believe that the grant of a new trial in this case was 
based on considerably more than the premise that the 
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 
  
While the district court did believe that the verdict was 
against the weight of the evidence—and granted 
j.n.o.v.—its grant of a new trial was based on additional 
concerns about the relevance of evidence (admitted under 
the disparate impact theory) to the disparate treatment 
theory; the likelihood that the jury was confused by the 
plaintiffs’ arguments and evidence admitted on the 
disparate impact theory which was no longer relevant to 
case;21 and the court’s perception that Dr. Ignatin’s 
testimony, which mainly focused on the disparate impact 
theory, dealt a great deal with the fairness of the 
University’s treatment of plaintiffs, as opposed to whether 
the University committed age discrimination against 
them.22 Because deference is due the district court’s 
first-hand experience of the evidence, the witnesses, and 
the jury in the context of trial, we cannot say that the 
court abused its discretion; and we affirm the grant of a 
new trial on the disparate treatment theory of age 
discrimination. 
  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court’s action in directing the 
verdict on the disparate impact theory of discrimination, 
vacate the grant of j.n.o.v. on the disparate treatment 
theory of discrimination, and affirm the district court’s 
conditional grant of a new trial on the disparate treatment 
theory. Therefore, we remand the case for new trial. 
  
AFFIRMED in part; VACATED in part; and 
REMANDED for new trial. 
  
All Citations 
922 F.2d 766, 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 13, 55 
Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,539, 59 USLW 2502, 65 Ed. Law 
Rep. 68 
 
Footnotes 
 
* 
 
Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by designation. 
 
1 
 
Plaintiffs based their age discrimination case on two different theories: disparate impact and disparate treatment. 
Briefly stated, the disparate impact theory of discrimination is that the employer uses some facially neutral, 
non-job-related employment practice which has a disproportionately adverse effect upon the members of a protected 
group. The disparate treatment theory is that the employer intends to discriminate against the members of a protected 
group and does so. 
 
2 
 
The faculty ranks at the University (lowest to highest) are instructor, assistant professor, associate professor, and full 
professor. Most of the hiring is done at the assistant professor level, at which level the University may hire a person 
with a master’s degree (M.S.), a person who has completed the course work for a doctorate but has not completed his 
dissertation (A.B.D.), or a person who has finished his dissertation and has a doctorate (Ph.D. or D.B.A.). 
 
3 
 
In July 1989, he received an LL.M. in taxation. 
 
4 
 
Another professor hired at the same time as Narz has served as long as Narz. 
 
5 
 
The University has indicated that the A.A.C.S.B. is a prestigious institution which accredits select schools of business. 
A.A.C.S.B. accreditation enhances the ability of a school of business to raise funds, to attract faculty and students, and 
to place students upon graduation. 
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6 
 
For purposes of A.A.C.S.B. accreditation standards, a professor is doctorally qualified if he holds a terminal degree in 
his teaching field. Such a professor is deemed qualified to teach any course within his field, regardless of the courses 
he actually teaches. 
 
7 
 
One of the reasons for A.A.C.S.B.’s no-visit response to the College of Business’s first application for accreditation in 
1983–84 was that the College of Business lacked a sufficient number of doctorally qualified professors in accounting 
and management. Another reason was the faculty’s lack of research and publication. 
 
8 
 
These accreditation efforts came to fruition in 1987 when the University became the smallest public university in the 
United States to have a nationally accredited business program. 
 
9 
 
When one speaks of a prima facie case in the employment discrimination context, what is ordinarily meant is that 
enough has been shown to require defendant to produce some evidence. Halsell v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 
285, 291 (8th Cir.1982); see also Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521–22 & n. 10 (5th Cir.1982) (prima 
facie case only creates rebuttable presumption and shifts burden to defendant to produce evidence). 
 
10 
 
Despite the practice of having shifting burdens of production in employment discrimination cases, grants of directed 
verdicts for defendants at the close of plaintiff’s evidence are proper even if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie 
case as long as plaintiff’s case-in-chief also contains evidence sufficient to meet defendant’s burden of production and 
the evidence overall at the close of plaintiff’s case is insufficient to allow a rational jury to find for the plaintiff. See 
Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 696 (7th Cir.1987); Ekanem v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cty., Ind., 724 
F.2d 563, 568 (7th Cir.1983); Halsell, 683 F.2d at 291–92; Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533–34 (9th Cir.1981); 
see also Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 828–29 (11th Cir.1988) (“the fact that a plaintiff has established 
a prima facie case does not in and of itself foreclose the possibility of summary judgment being granted in favor of the 
employer”). 
 
11 
 
Plaintiffs rely on A.A.C.S.B. salary scales to establish the “market rates” for the average faculty member at a certain 
rank in a given discipline or field. 
 
12 
 
The district court also concluded that this evidence did not prove the existence of an alternative to the recruitment 
practice of paying market rates to new hires, but only provided a remedy for the alleged disparate impact of this 
practice. Because we find that the evidence was insufficient to meet plaintiffs’ burden to prove an equally effective 
alternative, we do not reach this issue. 
 
13 
 
Therefore, we need not decide today whether an alternative practice that is economically feasible but is still more 
expensive than the employer’s current practice can be “equally effective” within the meaning of Wards Cove. 
 
14 
 
Because we find that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under a disparate impact theory of age discrimination, we 
have assumed—without deciding—that a disparate impact claim of age discrimination can be made where (as here) 
plaintiffs allege a practice that encompasses more than one point in the employment process. But see American Fed. 
of State, County, & Mun. Employees [AFSCME] v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1405 (9th Cir.1985) 
(“[d]isparate impact analysis is confined to cases that challenge a specific, clearly delineated employment practice 
applied at a single point in the job selection process”). We have also assumed—without deciding—that a disparate 
impact claim of age discrimination can be made where (as here) plaintiffs allege a practice which is based on the 
market. But see Spaulding, 740 F.2d 686 (rejecting disparate impact theory of sex discrimination where employees 
received disparate compensation for work of subjectively equal value to employer but which do not command equal 
prices in market); Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.1980) (same); AFSCME v. State of 
Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (same). 
 
15 
 
This part is treated with some flexibility. In some circuits, a plaintiff in a similar age discrimination case would only 
need to establish that a similarly situated younger person (including a younger person within the protected age group) 
received higher wages. See Carter, 870 F.2d at 582 n. 11 & 583 n. 14. 
 
16 
 
In a comparator analysis, the plaintiff is matched with a person or persons who have very similar job-related 
characteristics and who are in a similar situation to determine if the plaintiff has been treated differently than others 
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 
 
11
et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: M
Published by The Keep, 2017
Herbert, William 3/10/2017 
For Educational Use Only 
MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766 (1991)  
55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 13, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,539, 59 USLW 2502... 
 
who are similar to him. 
 
17 
 
Associate professors outrank assistant professors. Although the fields of management and marketing are close with 
regard to salary scales, marketing professors, during most of the period at issue, commanded slightly higher salaries. 
 
18 
 
In terms of salary scales, the field of accounting is at the top of the business school salary range and business law is at 
the bottom. 
 
19 
 
The order of the fields or disciplines from highest paying to lowest paying is: accounting, finance, economics, 
marketing, management, and business law. 
 
20 
 
Evidence also showed that during the first semester that Hamilton taught M.I.S., he was eliminated from teaching it in 
the future. 
 
21 
 
This confusion is especially important given that the district court itself indicated confusion between disparate impact 
and disparate treatment and that the court declined to instruct the jury that the court had directed a verdict on the 
disparate impact theory and that the jury should ignore evidence presented regarding that theory. 
 
22 
 
The district court stated, during the course of the trial, its impression that Dr. Ignatin “comes across quite frankly very 
heavy on what is fair in the labor movement, labor market. We are dealing here with what could be grossly unfair 
payment and wage scale.” 
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